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GOVERNANCE, REPRESENTATION AND 
THE ‘MONSTROUS REGIMENT’: IS THE 
COLLECTIVE FEMININE? 
JOHN MORSS∗ 
Alternatives to the individualistic emphasis of liberal theory focus attention 
on collective dimensions of social life with implications for legal and 
political analysis of the state, of representation, and of international law. In 
this context, relationships between the individual–collective dichotomy and 
the dichotomy of gender demand attention because of the claimed 
affiliations of individualism with social understandings of masculinity. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Liberal theory over several centuries and in many variants has exalted the 
individual as the proper agent and locus of political life. The liberal approach 
to democratic governance of states focuses on the enjoyment of franchise by 
individual voting citizens. International law swings in behind with its 
elevation of the universal human rights of individuals, on the basis of which 
states owe fiduciary obligations to those citizens, thereby acquiring the 
privileges of sovereignty. Alternatives and responses to this liberal world 
view look instead to collectives for legitimacy in governance. ‘Collectivism’ 
in this sense may be said to include communitarian and socialist traditions in 
political theory as well as nationalism and totalitarianism.1  
Alongside the debate between individualism and collectivism in the political 
sphere, feminist theorists and activists have continued to interrogate the 
gendered parameters of governance. The liberal individual has been exposed 
as an individual thought of as male. And if the rights of persons worldwide 
are understood as the universalised expression of the rights of an abstract 
individual, then this abstract individual has somehow remained a masculine 
individual. A powerful ideological alliance is thus defined, a hegemonic 
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alignment of individualism with masculinity. The ‘other’ to this ‘self’ would 
thus, it would appear, take the form of a feminine collective.  
Problems with this vision are many, not least the concerns suggested by the 
‘dark sides’ of collectivism as noted above. There is also the uneasy feeling 
that this counter-alliance has been brought forth and in a sense constituted by 
the individual–masculine ‘complex’ itself. Yet the inadequacies of the latter, 
‘master’ formula are so serious that this tentative formulation of the feminine 
collective should be explored, and its potential for the articulation of 
resistance opened up. As Knop et al describe in relation to multiculturalism, 
the challenges involved in seeking to maintain a sensitivity both to gender and 
to culture do not justify a quietist relapse into methodological individualism.2 
The purpose of the present article is thus to explore the contested and in some 
ways paradoxical notion of the feminisation of the collective; and to indicate 
some possible consequences in relation to governance and to gender politics, 
with especial attention being paid to the ways in which these processes are 
manifest in the context of international law.  
No enquiry comes from nowhere. A faith in solidarity animates this project, 
tempered by the awareness that the cultural and intellectual traditions on 
which the author draws are Occidental, and contaminated by privilege, in 
myriad ways. As Sundhya Pahuja writes, ‘It is relatively clear why we should 
be uneasy with the desire to save the world and with the avatars of that 
desire’3 (‘[s]uch as development, transitional justice, humanitarian 
intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, democratisation and the rule of 
law, etc)’.4 Pahuja continues: ‘After the critique of the trope of salvation and 
the identification of its tenacious hold on international law as an underlying 
philosophy of history, it is possible to see the desire to save as the 
continuation of the ‘benevolence of Empire’.5 But this is by no means all the 
baggage that one carries. ‘To stay with international law in order to call it to 
account in terms of its own promises of universality would be to downplay the 
consequences of the role of developmentalism in holding up that promise, and 
to replay Eurocentrism at the heart of critique.’6 
Pahuja encapsulates two key concerns of critical international law in the 
following way: ‘[H]ow to tackle the persistent Eurocentrism of the critique of 
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Eurocentrism within critical international legal scholarship; how to express 
solidarity with those who suffer without that suffering becoming the 
foundation for one’s authority.’7 Pahuja’s focus is on authority and its 
negotiation on the world stage. Gender politics plays a background role in the 
paper from which these quotations from Pahuja have been taken, but gendered 
experiences and understandings can hardly fail to contribute to the constructed 
identity of the author of any intervention in scholarly debate any more than 
the consequences of class and geography can fail to do so. It is therefore with 
what is hoped to be is a strategic awareness of such constraining locations and 
positionings that this essay sets out. And the dichotomy of self as autonomous 
individual, versus self as defined by the groupings and communities with 
which one identifies or is associated with in the eyes of others, is a dichotomy 
that bears witness to an ontological divide of fundamental significance: the 
one and the many. As Ratna Kapur has observed in the post-colonial context, 
self-sufficiency as a trope of liberal theory is complemented by that theory’s 
account of the neutrality of the market-place within which such self-sufficient 
individuals supposedly compete. Thus ‘[t]here is an illusion that the 
individual can be in control of her life, while collective struggles and 
institutions that enable self-sufficiency are undermined’.8 The ideology 
described here by Kapur is presumably the gist of Margaret Thatcher’s claim 
that ‘there is no such thing as society’,9 against which it can said with Kapur 
that without society there is no individual.  
Related issues have already been subjected to scrutiny in contemporary debate 
in public international law. In her contribution to International Law and Its 
Others Dianne Otto has posed the question: ‘What alternatives are there to the 
abstract universal subject and his female “others”?’10 Otto’s query arises in 
the context of international human rights law, but its significance is even 
broader. This formula indeed obstructs the production of ‘emancipatory 
gender subjectivities’,11 as Otto remarks, and it does so in a multiplicity of 
ways. Each part of Otto’s question is significant. There is the abstract 
universal subject, identified as male by the subsequent ‘his’. ‘He’ is singular, 
individual. There are the female ‘others’, some kind of collective. And there is 
the grammatically possessive connection between them: ‘his’. The focus of 
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this article is this doubly asymmetrical formula of the individual man and the 
collective of women. The trouble starts with the abstractness of the universal 
male subject: 
The allegedly neutral universal subject of human rights law also reproduces 
other hierarchies, including those of race, culture, nation, socio-economic 
status and sexuality, which intersect with constructions of gender to produce 
subjects that bear the markings of complex histories of subjugation and 
resistance.12  
But this formula also sets up the feminine as plural or collective other to the 
singularity of the universal masculine. In some ways the contrast defines and 
validates the latter. As Otto expresses this, ‘the universal subject … continues 
to rely for its universality on its contrast with feminized particularities’.13 In 
Lorraine’s analysis of Luce Irigaray, ‘the contemporary masculine subject 
reflects himself onto a feminine other in order to affirm himself repeatedly as 
a self-identical and self-sufficient subject’.14 The role of the feminine is, so to 
speak, as that of conceptual support team to the masculine champion. It is a 
team that drops out of ‘his-story’ like so much scaffolding, because the logic 
of the universal is that it does not rely on particulars at all. To force the 
universal and the particulars to cohabit is, as Hegel might have said, to deploy 
violence.15 The same can be said of the individual and the collective. Thus, 
when jammed reluctantly together, the solitary man and the horde of women 
take up a troubled project.  
The formula man: women (so to express it), it will be suggested, plays some 
important roles in our thinking about governance. For the question of 
governance is in many ways the question of representation, which is the 
question of the one and the many in political life. At least since the time of 
Thomas Hobbes this has puzzled political philosophers. Among the gendered 
aspects of this question is a particular aspect of the asymmetry: the asymmetry 
between a masculine one and a feminine many. It is a sign of the hegemony of 
this gendered asymmetry in political life that it is the reverse formulation — 
many men ruled by one woman — that has historically been seen as 
scandalous. John Knox’s diatribe against what he called the ‘monstrous 
regiment’ (that is, rule) of women in the time of Mary Tudor is an extreme but 
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not an isolated example.16 The scandalous quality of the apocryphal ‘Pope 
Joan’ arises from the same world view.17 More recently, attempts by women 
leaders to bring collective issues to the world stage after the end of World 
War I, for example, in the context of the design of a League of Nations and of 
a policy of self-determination, were greeted with hysterical predictions as to 
the calamitous societal effects of such political activity. Neglecting their 
family-centred, reproductive mission in this way threatened (in the words of 
the French psychologist Gustave Le Bon) to make of the European ‘a nomad 
without a home or a family’.18 Even in the 21st century political leaders who 
are female receive special, gendered attention such as intensified sartorial 
commentary and scrutiny of lifestyle choices. Clearly then political leadership 
by women is sometimes seen as disruptive or, at least, worthy of remark. At 
some level there is a presupposition that women’s place is not in the lead but 
in the ranks of the led. This may be called the dark side of the discourse of the 
collective as feminine. But there is also something of a bright side.  
The individuality of the masculine ‘one’ is itself problematic in ways that 
involve but also exceed questions of gender politics. There are thus important 
upsides to ‘the collective’, and to collective forms of analysis in social life, 
that confer what might be thought of as a positive evaluation on the occupants 
of that sphere. To accept a definition of collectivity as inferior may be to buy 
into the dichotomy, to collaborate in the key move by which individualism 
proclaims itself master. The rehabilitation of the collective may even 
contribute to the production of ‘emancipatory gender subjectivities’.19 Of 
course simplistic reductions, involving the demonising of the individualistic, 
have to be avoided here. An Orwellesque reduction of individualism, yoked 
with masculinity, as ‘bad’, and collectivism, yoked with femininity, as ‘good’, 
which is one reformulation of the dichotomy, would surely be inadequate. In 
any case the term ‘individual’ and its various grammatical forms are 
problematic. The validity of a broader critique of ‘individualism’ has been 
queried on the grounds of imprecision: Martha Nussbaum asks, ‘Isn’t it time 
to declare a moratorium on the use of the word “individualism”, with its 
multiple ambiguities?’20 The notion of ‘collective’ is scarcely less complex. A 
more nuanced exploration may, however, be of value. 
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The critique of individualism, and the related exploration of communitarian or 
cosmopolitan alternatives, is itself a well-established tradition of social 
thought. Within jurisprudence new attention is being given to the role of a 
collectivist analysis in public international law, an area of study previously 
dominated by highly individualistic conceptual frameworks.21 The more 
visionary of international legal theorists seem to have been working to 
articulate a ‘global solidarity’.22 Questions of governance inevitably arise 
from such projects. Therefore while international politics tends to illustrate 
the downside of the feminisation of the collective, international jurisprudence 
offers some possibilities for the re-evaluation of that feature. International law 
has been subjected to feminist critique in recent decades and the re-evaluation 
of the collective may be thought of as a contribution to that continuing 
project.  
The attempt is made to sketch some of the cultural history of this notion, 
including its place in popular culture as well as in the writings of key authors 
in the sphere of subjectivity. Some comments are therefore made on the 
contributions of Nietzsche and of Freud, and on the background to their 
formulations. Alone or together (given the overlaps among their intellectual 
antecedents and among their intellectual followers), Nietzsche and Freud have 
generated or perpetuated a substantial fraction of the tropes and discourses 
available to the western intelligentsia regarding human gender. As Lisa 
Appignanesi and John Forrester put it, ‘[c]ontemporary thinking about what 
woman is is so permeated with the discourse that Freud and his women 
invented that it is impossible to conceive of a future language of sexuality that 
does not call on the name of Freud’.23 Some discussion of the disciplines of 
psychology and of philosophy is therefore required. This approach is not new 
to scholarship in public international law and in the history of international 
governance,24 although some versions of the appeal to the humanities within 
critical international legal studies are problematic.25  
Both Nietzsche and Freud seem to have considered women to be something of 
a mystery, at times a threatening mystery: ‘Throughout history people have 
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knocked their heads against the riddle of the nature of femininity.’26 ‘The 
woman question’ has continued to be vexatious for their male intellectual 
heirs in recent times, with both Derrida and Deleuze having been accused 
from time to time of lacking feminist backbone and even, in effect, of 
collaborating in the long traditions of scholarly misogyny. Rosi Braidotti has 
suggested that Derrida assimilates and domesticates feminist theory.27 Gayatri 
Spivak suggests in the context of Derrida’s discussions of sexual difference, 
seen as illustrative of male deconstructionist philosophy, that ‘the question of 
woman in general … is their question, not ours’.28 In any event both 
Nietzsche and Freud relied in significant ways on the women in their lives, 
including the women who they considered in their different ways to be 
professional colleagues. One of the latter, Lou Andreas-Salomé, was indeed a 
mutual colleague of both men, albeit at different periods of her life. 
‘Nietzsche’s circle of women’ is discussed by Julian Young, and Freud’s 
Women are discussed by Appignanesi and Forrester.29 Behind every great man 
there is, it appears, a group of women. To begin the exploration of this trope 
and of its consequences, something should be said on the positive role of the 
collective in public international law. For international law is not about 
potentates: it is about the proletariat.  
II THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The examination of individuals and collectives as such, as the objects, 
subjects or agents of law, is an ongoing project. A good case can be made that 
public international law urgently needs to be reconceptualised from a 
methodologically individualistic discipline to a communitarian or collectivist 
one.30 This proposal starts from the position that public international law is 
concerned with populations, with their movements and with their stasis, with 
their governance and with their interactions. Above all perhaps international 
law is concerned with the intermingling of populations, across time and across 
space. Self-determination yields good examples of this. As Waldron 
comments: ‘If the state is conceived — in however humane a spirit — as the 
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possession of a particular people, its status vis-à-vis other peoples coexisting 
in the same territory is bound to be problematic.’31 A linguistic minority may 
feel like second-class citizens in a larger polity, but if that minority becomes 
the majority in a seceded entity, then another minority may be automatically 
generated. ‘The iterations have a sort of fractal quality, whose regress reflects 
the point [that] … peoples and communities are inevitably intermingled.’32  
To reduce populations to unitary, ‘Westphalian’ entities, especially to states, 
is to impose a particular ideological framework. In particular it is to impose a 
form of individualism in analysis which is closely related to liberalism, long 
dominant in international law’s conceptual structure.33 Influential 
formulations of a liberal approach to international law continue to appear, 
John Rawls’ Law of Peoples being notorious in this regard.34 The gendered 
character of the liberal–individualism of the state has been interrogated by 
Teemu Ruskola in historical perspective. Ruskola examines a kind of 
‘normative masculinity’ of states in their relationships with each other, a 
conceptual framework in which, for example, China’s style of ‘masculinity’ 
was seen as deviant. This in turn played a part in constituting China as a 
legitimate target for foreign intervention, both military and economic, by 
more manly nations, so to speak, in a way that could be figuratively described 
as homoerotic violence.35 Certainly a discourse of the state as man was 
familiar in the 19th century. Around mid-century, strongly influenced by the 
Romantic movement, the Swiss constitutional jurist Bluntschli asserted that 
‘the State-organism has not only a personality and a will but also a sex — it is 
masculine as contrasted with the Church which is feminine’.36  
In the discipline as we know it, states are treated as special kinds of 
individuals, and so are ‘peoples’. This is what is meant by the orthodox 
statement that states and peoples are subjects of international law. 
Subjecthood for the latter is generally speaking contingent on the status of a 
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self-determination claim, although protections against the various forms of 
genocide may also be said to exemplify the subjecthood of peoples under 
international law. Individual human persons are also, increasingly, treated as 
the bearers of universalised human rights or as vulnerable to international 
prosecution as criminals. According to Domingo, ‘in this new global 
paradigm the person is the primary subject and focus, and is not relegated to a 
secondary role, as happened with the application of the [statist] international 
law paradigm’.37 Domingo cites with approval the comments of Anne Peters 
in this regard: ‘In a constitutional world order, natural persons are … the 
primary members of the global constitutional community.’38 Recent advocacy 
of a ‘fiduciary’ analysis of state obligations to their citizens, under peremptory 
and other norms of international law, is a related proposal.39 An important line 
of argument drawing inspiration from philosophical traditions, especially 
from Kant, converges on the claim that international law should be thought of 
as focused on the needs and rights of natural persons, and evaluated in those 
terms.40 To the extent that the ‘textbook’ international law that is about the 
conduct of states and of peoples is itself ‘really’ a law of individuals, a trend 
from state-focused to natural-person-focused forms of international law might 
be said to be the mere re-branding of an individualistic understanding of 
international law. 
This enhanced status for individual persons in international law is of course, 
in important ways, a direct implementation of liberalism. Consistent with this 
perspective, it can be argued that the individuality of the first two kinds of 
entity mentioned above — of the state and of the people — is a metaphorical 
application or extension of the individuality of the third. States and peoples 
may be merely quasi-individuals. They may be ‘legal fictions’ that rely on the 
authenticity of our conceptualisation of the individual human person. This 
would be the orthodox view, which would treat the individuality of the human 
person as authentic and the individuality of state or people as artificial, along 
the same lines as granting legal personhood to a private corporation. It may on 
the other hand be argued that the ‘individuality’ is constructed, or ‘legally 
fictionalised’, in respect of all three entities. Social construction traditions in 
the social sciences might suggest this broader critique which is disinclined to 
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treat the humanist concept of individual person as sacrosanct.41 Within the 
theory of international law, Kelsen’s norm-focused approach42 may be said to 
converge on this position, an argument that is brought into focus by 
comparison with the person-centred orientation of his contemporary Hersch 
Lauterpacht. Feminist problematisation of the bearer of universal human 
rights as masculine contributes to the same sceptical project, as does Marxist 
critique of the ‘bourgeois’ characteristics of the rights enjoyed by the putative 
rights-bearer.43 So far as human rights are concerned, it thus can be argued 
that the internationally relevant rights and obligations of individual persons 
only arise, and only make sense, within the context of the protection of, and 
respect for, collectives. Similarly, the contemporary information economy 
with its proliferation of ‘big data’ gives rise to new possibilities of ‘claims and 
collectivities’, and to ‘alliances and subjectivities not previously configured 
within public international legal purview’.44 Of course as Johns’s paper 
illustrates, there are ‘dark sides’ to this story as well. Collective 
understandings of political life include totalitarianisms and fundamentalist 
crusades, the siege mentality, xenophobia and so on, just as much as they 
include progressive community activism. Yet it does seem possible to discern 
a deep conceptual collaboration between an individualistic ideology for 
international law and a privileging of the masculine. Whence could such 
cultural connections derive? To answer this question requires some discussion 
of scientific and popular discursive traditions, as well as some attention to the 
claims of philosophy and of psychology. These two groupings of resources 
are dealt with in turn.  
III MASCULINITY, INDIVIDUALISM AND A CULTURE OF 
MISOGYNY IN POPULAR AND SCIENTIFIC CULTURE 
The pitfalls of the asymmetrical formula man: women are many. Some of 
these pitfalls arise from the excessive familiarity of the assumptions that 
underlie its varied versions. There are many ways in which these various 
dualities seem to match up, to such an extent that the correspondence seems 
over-determined. There are a variety of positions and familiar claims from 
within the humanities (and social sciences) according to which individualism 
connotes autonomy, activity, self-sufficiency, assertiveness and all the other 
‘John Wayne’ qualities traditionally identified as masculine within modern 
                                                 
41 Ben Bradley and John R Morss, ‘Social Construction in a World at Risk: Toward a 
Psychology of Experience’ (2002) 12 Theory & Psychology 509. 
42 Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in 
Universal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ruskola, above n 35, 1488.  
43 Kellogg, above n 15, 18. 
44 Fleur Johns, ‘The Deluge’ (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 9, 30. 
2014 IS THE COLLECTIVE FEMININE? 173 
western culture.45 From time to time neuroscience provides what purports to 
be evidence in support of ‘anatomy as destiny’. Correspondingly, ‘womanly’ 
virtues as traditionally conceived would seem to centre around receptivity, 
sharing, caring, nurturing, interdependence and sympathy. 
A series of sources and resources in the cultural repertoire may be drawn upon 
in order to illustrate the discourses of ‘individual as masculine’ and of 
‘collective as feminine’. One set of ideas with which to start is the 
misogynistic vision of women as a feared ‘species’. John Knox’s notorious 
diatribe, The first blast of the trumpet against the monstrous regiment of 
women, was directed at the rule (‘regiment’) of named female sovereigns and 
political leaders of his times. Its argument was that women in general lack the 
qualities — physical, cognitive and emotional — appropriate for leadership. 
According to Knox: 
[N]ature revealed women to be ‘weak, frail, impatient, feeble and foolish, 
and experience hath declared them to be inconstant, variable, cruel and 
lacking the spirit of counsel and regiment’. Female magistracy was an 
‘abomination’. ‘repugnant to nature, contumely to God, a thing most 
contrarious to His revealed will’, and ‘finally it is the subversion of good 
order, of all equity and justice’.46  
Machiavelli had also made the point that women’s involvement in public 
affairs was to be avoided, although as a pragmatist he recognised that female 
consorts might from time to time inherit positions of power. They were 
presumably to be wisely advised, like male Princes, not summarily dismissed 
from office.47  
Less venomously than Knox, but on a wider front, popular culture in the west 
over several centuries since his time may be said to exemplify a view of 
women as ‘all the same’. The title of Mozart’s Cosi Fan Tutte (libretto by Da 
Ponte) translates approximately as ‘they are all like that’. Closer to our time, 
the Sherlock Holmes stories are a valuable source of insight into popular 
thought as well as popular science of the late 19th century.48 For Sherlock 
Holmes, a century after Mozart, to fixate on opera singer Irene Adler as ‘the 
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woman’49 gains its effect precisely from Ms Adler standing out from the 
crowd in Holmes’s refined perception. Neither Watson nor Moriarty was, it 
appears, ‘the man’ for Holmes. Individuality in men did not need to be 
remarked upon. The fluidity with which Watson’s wife appears and 
disappears from various stories also suggests the anonymity of the (female) 
crowd. John le Carré’s George Smiley also blends into crowds, one of his 
several womanly qualities, as one might say.50 This self-effacement, perhaps 
amounting to masochism, also characterises James Joyce’s sometimes 
woman-like Leopold Bloom in Ulysses.51 
To continue the operatic theme, Ms Irene Adler may have performed in 
Verdi’s Rigoletto with its famous aria La donna è mobile. Fickleness, 
unpredictability, vulnerability to ephemeral circumstances, sensitivity to 
nature, and suggestibility can perhaps all be linked as a ‘discourse’. Women 
are housebound but wont to tyrannise the house and drive men out into the 
world.52 With the phenomenon of multiple personalities, beloved of the 
entertainment industry, every woman is already lots of women (Eve, Tara). 
By contrast, in popular culture, civilised men may contain one beast within 
them (Mr Hyde, The Incredible Hulk), but rarely a roomful. Women are 
somehow multiple and interchangeable, the Bunny Girl or backing singer, the 
groupie or the ‘comfort woman’. In The Beggar’s Opera, a man muses on a 
choice between two mistresses: ‘How happy could I be with either/Were 
t’other dear Charmer away!’53 Structuralist theory offers a straightforward 
reading of such examples, with women being exchanged along the line like 
the port at High Table: ‘[t]he system of exchange in which all women are 
objects.’54 
None of these examples from popular or literary culture is conclusive and 
prejudicial generalities about men are also easy to locate: ‘Boys will be boys, 
but girls will be women.’ Enough has been said to make the point that if there 
are valuable associations between the collective and the feminine, there are 
also seriously toxic forms of that correspondence. One important line of 
thinking about gender differences, which straddled popular and scientific 
discourse, was an evolutionist form of the exaltation of the elite adult male. 
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This formula dominated debate in the final decades of the nineteenth century 
and both reflected and sustained biologically determinist views on race, 
gender and much more beside. In hindsight it is difficult not to find the claims 
ludicrous as well as offensive. The adult elite male, at least when awake, sane, 
and sober, was found to be superior in fairly much every way to primitives, 
children, women, the Irish, and so on.55 Havelock Ellis, the British sexologist 
influential on Freud,56 compared posture and locomotion in women, in the 
lower classes, and in country people. When these groups were contrasted with 
the upright, adult urban gentleman, their posture and locomotion 
approximated to that of children. Thus women are ‘nearer to the infantile 
condition than men’.57 Chamberlain’s The Child: A Study in Evolution of Man 
(published in 1900) described how ‘[a] prominent abdomen is a noticeable 
characteristic alike of children, women, and many primitive races’.58 All this 
was in line with evolutionist anthropology.59 Decades earlier, comparison of 
brains had suggested that ‘with ‘its rounded apex and less developed posterior 
lobe the Negro brain resembles that of our children, and by the protuberance 
of the parietal lobe, that of our females’.60 Thus ‘[t]he grown-up Negro 
partakes, as regards his intellectual faculties, of the nature of the child, the 
female, and the senile white’.61 Weight told the same story: ‘Men of the black 
races have a brain scarcely heavier than that of white women.’62  
In 1870 Cope wrote that  
[t]he gentler sex is characterised by a great impressibility … warmth of 
emotion, submission to its influence rather than that of logic, timidity and 
irregularity of action in the outer world. … [P]erhaps all men can recall a 
period of youth when they were hero-worshippers — when they felt the 
need of a stronger arm, and loved to look up to the powerful friend who 
could sympathize with and aid them. This is the ‘woman stage’ of 
character.63  
As Gould notes,  
[w]omen fitted the argument especially well for two reasons — the social 
observation that men wrote all the textbooks and the morphological fact that 
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skulls of adult women are more childlike than those of men. Since the child 
is a living primitive, the adult woman must be as well.64  
A similar position was taken by Le Bon, prominent French psychologist of the 
late 19th century, and influential author of The Crowd: A Study of the Popular 
Mind. Le Bon proposed that: 
[P]sychologists who have studied the intelligence of women, as well as 
poets and novelists, recognize today that they represent the most inferior 
forms of human evolution and that they are closer to children and savages 
than to an adult, civilized man. They excel in fickleness, inconstancy, 
absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason … A desire to give 
them the same education, and, as a consequence, to propose the same goals 
for them, is a dangerous chimera … The day when, misunderstanding the 
inferior occupations which nature has given her, women leave the home and 
take part in our battles; on this day a social revolution will begin, and 
everything that maintains the sacred ties of the family will disappear.65 
In relation to crowds, Le Bon observed that: 
It will be remarked that among the special characteristics of crowds there 
are several — such as impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the 
absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the 
sentiments, and others besides — which are almost always observed in 
beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution — in women, savages, and 
children, for instance.66 
Le Bon’s significance should not be underestimated. Hans Kelsen found it 
necessary to tackle a line of thinking that he detected in Le Bon, Durkheim 
and in Freud, among others, by which group conduct was treated in quasi-
psychological terms (a ‘collective soul’ and so on).67 Freud comments 
positively on Kelsen’s intervention in this debate.68 ‘Women, savages, and 
children’ are all major targets of international rights protections in the 
contemporary era if the right to self-determination can be thought of in 
relation to the second term.69 In each case it can perhaps be said that the 
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predominant attitude to those protected groups or populations, is to treat them 
as ‘victims’.70 At least from a liberal perspective, individuals in possession of 
agency do not need, or would not accept, such protection.  
International governance intersects with the gendered and power-driven world 
views of the elite in a variety of ways. In this context, some of the most potent 
images of the feminine in Western culture interconnect with Orientalism. 
Orientalism in Edward Said’s account has functioned to blinker Western 
consciousness about its own place in the world as well as the place of others 
so that enquiring into it is a form of critique.71 There are significant 
correspondences between the Occidental construction of the Orient and of the 
feminine. There are significant correspondences between the Occidental 
construction of itself, and of the masculine. Orientalism as explored by Said is 
a mode of Western thought which constructs an East out of its own fears and 
desires and interposes that construction between itself and any encounter with 
the alien.72 The Orient is thus an imagined place, no less imaginary for its 
concrete realisation in innumerable cultural products from The Mikado to The 
Thief of Baghdad. Nor is its imaginary status compromised by its concrete 
realisation in whatever geographical territories we subsume under it from time 
to time, for the Orient is a moveable banquet.  
Said’s notion of Orientalism involves the depiction of the East over several 
centuries by the elite of the Occidental world, whether diplomats, scholars, 
painters or writers of fiction. Orientalism represents the East in a manifold 
and complex manner, frequently inconsistent and unsystematic in very much 
the way that Orientalism describes ‘the Eastern mind’. For Orientalism the 
East is dangerous, erotic, undisciplined, exciting, vibrant, ineffective, and 
massively overwhelming all at the same time: as one might say, over-sexed, 
over-populated, and over there. There is a closely associated trope of 
differentiation and individualism in relation to the West, and collective culture 
in the East. The latter notion is often couched in terms of family values. The 
Western orientation is often thought of as typified by the entrepreneurial spirit 
of the United States. Thus Orientalism, however diffuse and hybridised, 
contributes to the model of the autonomous and individual male set against 
the background of somewhat anonymous if alluring females. As Said 
powerfully describes, Orientalism included an overpowering urge to speak on 
behalf of the people of the East, to ‘represent’ them in the many meanings of 
that word. In this respect, among others, the Oriental is analogous to 
childhood, a state defined as deficient in both the capacity and the political 
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status to exercise autonomy. Like children, Easterners stand in need of 
interpretation and, at the discretion of the Westerner, either advocacy, 
discipline, or administrative guidance.73 One way or another they are on the 
‘receiving end’ of Western policy. Governance takes the form of domination 
of the many by the few.  
IV PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHOLOGY: 
THINKING MAN AND CARING WOMEN 
Philosophers have wrestled with gender questions as well as, not infrequently, 
contributing to the promulgation of discrimination. Gender privilege is deeply 
embedded in western philosophy. Derrida remarked that ‘there is an 
uninterrupted metaphysical familiarity with that which, so naturally, links the 
“we” of the philosopher to the “we men” to the “we” in the horizon of 
humanity’.74 In western philosophy of modern times, Schopenhauer is 
renowned for having characterised women as ‘childish, silly, and short-
sighted, in a word big children, their whole lives long: a kind of intermediate 
stage between the child and the man …’.75 Schopenhauer went on to say that 
‘the fundamental defect of the female character is a lack of a sense of justice. 
This originates first and foremost in their want of rationality and capacity for 
reflexion …’.76 Further, he states that  
[w]oman is more absorbed in the present than we are, so that, if the present 
is endurable at all, she enjoys it more, and this produces that cheerfulness 
characteristic of her through which she is so suited to entertain and, if need 
be, console the care-laden man.77 
Schopenhauer’s views can easily be dismissed as bigotry, along the same lines 
as the evolutionist formulations noted above, although his influence on later 
thinkers should not be overlooked. Thus Freud echoes the above remark when 
he says that  
[t]he fact that women must be regarded as having little sense of justice is no 
doubt related to the predominance of envy in their mental life; for the 
demand for justice is a modification of envy and lays down the condition 
subject to which one can put envy aside.78  
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Compared to Schopenhauer’s, Hegel’s formulations were considerably more 
sophisticated. His analogy between plants and women79 and his account of 
‘the divine, feminine law of the family and the masculine, human law of 
universality’80 demand at least a cautious suspension of disbelief, given the 
relationship of these claims to Hegel’s larger theoretical system. For Hegel, 
‘ethical life, or Sittlichkeit, requires that the more natural, feminine, 
unconscious realm of the family [must] be mediated by the cultural, 
masculine, and conscious realm of the state’.81 Indeed there is a 
developmental imperative here: ‘men inhabit the sphere of the family “on 
the[ir] way to the state”.’82 For Hegel then the state is closely associated with 
the masculine. Against the above background of gendered debate, Nietzsche’s 
comments about women were passionate if inconsistent. At times Nietzsche 
was unambiguously pro-feminist,83 and at other times ‘often offensive’. His 
views were ‘always colourful’.84 It was Nietzsche’s Zarathustra who was 
advised ‘You are going to women? Then don’t forget the whip’85 and who, 
according to Kennedy, opposed women’s emancipation ‘because it serves to 
“destroy the will to power and to encourage the herd mentality”’.86 Indeed, 
‘Nietzsche had little time for community, ascribing the idea of a national 
community to male impotence’.87  
Freud’s attitude to the masses could also be misanthropic.88 Nietzsche 
observed that ‘women are always less civilized than men … At the base of 
their souls they are wild’.89 But it was also Nietzsche who said the following: 
When a man stands in the midst of his own noise, in the midst of his own 
surf of plans and projects, then he is apt also to see quiet, magical beings 
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gliding past him and long for their happiness and seclusion: women. He 
almost thinks that his better self dwells there among the women.90  
To say that Nietzsche was conflicted about women is therefore perhaps an 
understatement. Nietzsche’s close friend Lou Andreas-Salomé — whip-bearer 
in a well-known, playful photograph91 — was a novelist and a nomadic 
intellectual as well as, in her middle and later years, a psychoanalyst. 
According to Appignanesi and Forrester, Andreas-Salomé’s approach was 
that woman possesses 
instinctual plenitude … She is whole, complete, like the original egg cell; 
she exists in a unity of spirit, intellect, body and feeling. Man, more 
differentiated than her, is forced by his dissatisfaction into ceaseless 
searching and Don Juanesque pursuits. This striving is a sign of male 
inadequacy.92 
In the second decade of the 20th century, in Vienna, Andreas-Salomé attended 
Alfred Adler’s meetings (‘the camp of masculine protest’ in Freud’s words93) 
as well as Freud’s own. She became a close and highly respected colleague to 
Freud, and in an extraordinary gesture of trust, co-analyst of Freud’s daughter 
Anna. In Freud’s Totem and Taboo (first published in 1912–13), the image of 
a primitive male horde was presented, as a way of portraying the ancestry of 
Oedipal feelings and other aspects of family dynamics.94 In Freud’s account, 
the male horde of brothers overthrew the father and ceremonially consumed 
him. ‘This memorable and criminal deed … was the beginning of so many 
things — of social organisation, of moral restrictions and of religion.’95 Freud 
continued: ‘An event such as the elimination of the primal father by the 
company of his sons must inevitably have left ineradicable traces in the 
history of humanity.’96 In response to this, Andreas-Salomé raised the idea of 
a matriarchal ancient society.97  
Freud seems to have thought of Andreas-Salomé as a paradigm of a woman 
thinker, writing to her later, ‘I tend to exclude all opinions except one, 
whereas you tend to include all opinions together’.98 Freud’s characteristic 
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‘Sherlock Holmes-like’ self-portrayal as the systematic scientist steadily 
excluding hypotheses, was very much a self-portrait as male thinker. As 
Holmes himself says to Watson, his spouse-like companion, ‘I shall keep 
piling fact upon fact on you, until your reason breaks down under them and 
acknowledges me to be right’.99 For Freud as for Holmes, facts are weapons. 
The contrasting inclusive style of thinking that Freud identified and praised in 
Andreas-Salomé was a positive spin on the traditional illogicality of the 
female. Lou Andreas-Salomé herself wrote succinctly: ‘Men argue and 
squabble. Women bestow grace.’100  
Moving to some comments on the discipline of psychology, in the early 
decades of the 20th century a dualistic formula on ‘two principles of mental 
functioning’ was emerging in psychiatric and psychological debate.101 This 
was influential on early conceptualisations of psychoanalysis, in Jung as well 
as in Freud, especially in relation to the more severe forms of mental 
disturbance that were the chief concern of Jung’s mentor Bleuler. It was 
Bleuler who coined the term ‘schizophrenia’ and described one of its 
characteristics as an ‘autistic’ style of thought, to be contrasted with rational, 
scientific or realistic thought. Autistic thinking is familiar to the normal 
person in the form of dreaming, as well as in imaginative thought more 
generally. In the normal, growing child autistic thinking gradually and 
grudgingly gives way to realistic thinking. As Freud put it in The 
Interpretation of Dreams: ‘Dreaming is a piece of infantile mental life that has 
been superseded.’102 This dualistic model, itself influenced by evolutionist 
thinking in neurology, began to be applied to the field of cognitive 
development in the individual child. Building in part on this dualistic model 
of human thinking, scientific, rational thinking was being articulated as the 
mature end-point of a series of stages of thinking from childhood onwards. 
The dualistic model contrasted a primitive kind of thought as in dreams or 
madness, or as in non-civilised adults, with a civilised, coherent, systematic 
kind of thinking. The baggage of this model of course included assumptions 
about gender. 
In the hands of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, younger children’s thinking 
and experience came to be defined as animistic, syncretic, and 
heteronomous.103 Autonomy of moral judgment as well as scientific ways of 
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understanding the world were defined as higher forms of thinking 
painstakingly evolved over years. While it would be simplistic to characterise 
Piagetian intellectual maturity as ‘male’, the image of autonomous scientist-
explorer owes much to the traditional conceptions of masculine and feminine 
thinking. Piaget's personal connection with psychoanalysis was through 
didactic analysis provided by the extraordinary Sabina Spielrein,104 former 
patient and probably sexual conquest of Jung and, by now, a forceful 
innovator within Freud’s circle. Russian-born like Andreas-Salomé, the much 
younger Spielrein read a paper to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society in 
1911 on ‘Destruction as the cause of coming into being’. The paper was 
delivered a year before Andreas-Salomé arrived in Vienna to study 
psychoanalysis. Spielrein’s work on destruction included the notion of a 
‘collective species-preserving sexual drive’ in tension with a ‘self-preserving 
ego-individual drive’.105 It was a precursor of Freud’s writings on the death 
instinct.106 
Later generations of psychoanalytic scholars and psychologists added in 
various ways to the conceptualisation of gender difference, of individuation 
and of autonomy. Piagetian-like stages of moral judgment through 
adolescence to adulthood were explored by Harvard psychologist Lawrence 
Kohlberg in the 1970s, on the basis of hypothetical ethical dilemmas.107 For 
example, a man called ‘Heinz’ is described in one scenario as desperate to 
assist his sick wife who may be helped by a new drug for which an 
exploitative pharmacist is charging way over the odds. Should Heinz (who is 
poor) break into the pharmacy and steal the drug? Most to the point, what 
reasons are given for saying yes he should, or no he should not? Kohlberg’s 
understanding of maturity in moral judgment, and of the immature steps 
toward it, was Kantian rather than Nietzschean. Advanced moral judgment is 
principled and not to be swayed by the pressures of conformity, or by 
considerations of personal consequences. Calling the man ‘Heinz’ — a 
‘foreign’ name — was one way of setting the scenario at a distance, to be 
analysed in a detached manner. Like Piaget’s, Kohlberg’s scientism 
prescribed that the affective be sequestered from the cognitive. 
Influenced by psychoanalytic versions of feminist theory, Kohlberg’s 
colleague Carol Gilligan proposed that the form of moral judgment defined by 
Kohlberg as mature is in important ways a masculine form. She described in 
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parallel a particularly female ‘ethic of care’108 generating a distinct form of 
moral judgment. This ‘different voice’ is said to be more inclusive, more 
concerned with how a victim, community or group is feeling, rather than 
basing moral decisions on abstract principles somewhat in the way of the 
Kantian categorical imperative, as Kohlberg had presupposed. To some extent 
women’s responses to Kohlberg’s research problems gave rise to a classifying 
of them as immature compared to male research subjects (although it should 
be stressed that Kohlberg found the highest level of moral judgment rare in 
adults of either sex).109 Gilligan’s dualistic model of moral judgment 
contrasted an abstract and autonomous orientation typical of males (itself 
perhaps the result of western practices in parenting and so on) with a feminine 
concrete caringness. Men, it was proposed, typically look for the ‘correct’ 
answer to a moral problem based on a systematic code; women, on the other 
hand, ascertain the needs and vulnerabilities of everyone involved and seek a 
solution grounded in a collective welfare.110 It might be observed that the 
distinction very much mirrors the contrast between criminal justice and 
reconciliation, two orientations that frequently emerge as rival ideologies in 
international post-conflict situations. 
Gilligan’s methodology remained fairly orthodox for a lifespan developmental 
psychologist, despite the indirect influence on her of psychoanalytic theory as 
well as her interests in narrative.111 Her influential work both reflected, and 
consolidated, notions of gender difference that give a central place to male 
autonomy on the one hand, and to female connectedness on the other. Kapur 
is critical of the essentialism of Gilligan’s approach, which she discusses in 
the context of certain United Nations Security Council (UNSC) initiatives 
toward increasing the participation of women in international decision-
making.112 To the extent that the rationale for such initiatives is that women 
are more naturally caring, and less naturally war-like, than men, this 
approach:  
reproduces gender essentialism and assumptions of women as naturally 
inclined towards caring and pursuing peace and also frames gender issues 
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within a security framework. The underlying assumption informing [UNSC] 
Resolution 1325 — that women inherently speak in a different voice than 
men — in turn implies that a gender perspective can be injected into the 
peace process, and women’s rights secured, simply by having women 
around the table.113 
V TOWARDS RESISTANCE: FEMINIST VOICES AND THE 
MALE CRITIC 
As Kapur indicates, the institutional recognition of the collective female can 
sometimes turn out to be a form of paternalistic tokenism in the sense that the 
possible contributions or disruptions of that collective are severely 
constrained. A form of essentialism is conserved such that appeal is made to 
supposedly inherent qualities of women as contrasted with men. In this 
regard, scepticism is appropriate in reading the debates on feminist 
contributions. Thus Judith Butler entertains the idea of ‘read[ing] Irigaray and 
Deleuze as in some sense replicating a sexual difference in their work (with 
Irigaray taking on the “feminine” work of corporeality and Deleuze the 
“masculine” work of the conceptual)’.114 Social commentator Michael Walzer 
has referred to Carol Gilligan’s work in the context of a discussion of Simone 
de Beauvoir. As Walzer notes, de Beauvoir dismissed the romantic notion of 
femalehood, as apparently endorsed by Andreas-Salomé, according to which 
‘woman has a particular closeness with the earth … she feels the rhythm of 
the moon, the ebb and flow of the tides … she has more soul, or is less 
destructive by nature’.115 Yet de Beauvoir discussed some characteristic male 
failings and female virtues as follows: 
For example, that grotesque masculine way of taking themselves seriously, 
their vanity, their self-importance … And then the habit of putting down all 
the competition — generally women don’t do that. And patience … is also a 
female characteristic. And a sense of irony. And a straightforward manner, 
since women have their feet on the ground because of the role they play in 
daily life. These ‘feminine’ qualities are a product of oppression, but they 
ought to be retained after our liberation. And men would have to learn to 
acquire them.116 
Walzer takes issue with de Beauvoir’s apparent strategy of ‘assimilation’ of a 
male world and world view, as in her suggestion that ‘[t]he future can only 
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lead to a more and more profound assimilation into our once masculine 
society’.117 This ‘imitation of men’ constrains de Beauvoir’s critical project, 
according to Walzer, so that while her ‘attack’ on ‘the male world [is] from 
the inside’, and for that reason effective, her critique of women is ‘from the 
outside’. Walzer concludes that ‘here her criticism needs to be supplemented 
by critics differently positioned, who explicitly defend different values, who 
speak “in a different voice” — a voice that is just barely audible, though 
always repressed, in her own best work’.118  
Walzer’s evaluation of de Beauvoir might be thought of as damning with faint 
praise, and could with ease be read as patronising. But the issues are 
important. Has de Beauvoir given too much away in supporting the work of 
Sartre — ‘walking a step or two behind … sometimes dragging her feet, 
sometimes hurrying to catch up’?119 Certainly de Beauvoir states that ‘men 
represent universality’ and that the modern woman ‘accepts masculine values: 
she prides herself on thinking, taking action, working, creating, on the same 
terms as men; instead of seeking to disparage them, she declares herself their 
equal’.120 But Walzer’s disparagement of de Beauvoir’s position seems like 
bad faith. There is something quietist about de Beauvoir’s program as there 
was for Virginia Woolf’s ‘a room of one’s own’ but the position of privilege 
from which Walzer speaks compromises his critique. To purport to detect de 
Beauvoir’s ‘just barely audible’ and repressed voice seems bold if not 
impudent. It is perhaps a kind of Orientalism at work. 
But ‘voice-talk’ is ubiquitous in accounts of feminist issues. In a discussion of 
law and literature in times of terror, Ian Ward describes the historical 
‘despatch’ of the female voice ‘to the realm of myth’, that is to say by 
patriarchy, such that the female voice ‘becomes the voice of the outsider, of 
the “other”’.121 In this connection Ward cites Maria Aristodemou who writes 
that in the beginning ‘there was not logos but music, not utilitarian word but 
an image, not law but a feeling’.122 Ward continues the above quoted passage 
by suggesting that the (female) voice of the outsider is ‘the voice which 
articulates a permanent challenge to patriarchal presumptions of universality 
... It terrifies, and the greatest terror of all is the terror of many voices’. This 
may be overstated but the reference to multitude is important. Ward’s 
immediate referent is Deborah Brevoort’s play The Women of Lockerbie in 
which the women seek to preserve and care for the memory of the victims of 
                                                 
117 Quoted in Walzer, ibid 161. 
118 Walzer, ibid 169. 
119 Ibid 153. 
120 Quoted in Walzer, ibid 162. 
121 Ian Ward, Law, Text, Terror (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 121. 
122 Quoted in Ward, ibid 121.  
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the crashed aeroplane in ways at odds with the demands of officialdom. 
Euripides’ The Trojan Women and The Bacchae are other texts to which Ward 
alludes in his valuable discussion of the literary portrayal of female 
communities and women’s solidarity. The Bacchae run wild, hunt animals and 
perform magic in Thebes under the influence of Dionysus. ‘The women of 
Lockerbie, like the women of Thebes, are a threat to order.’123 Womankind as 
alien order is a long-standing trope.124  
The heroic, solitary male has a way of laying down the international law, of 
pontificating. Thus:  
Humanity has no foundation and no ends, it is the definition of 
groundlessness … If rights express the endless trajectory of a nihilistic and 
insatiable desire, humanity’s only sacred aspect is its ability to sacrifice 
endlessly in order to re-sacralize the principle of sovereignty as terrible and 
awe-inspiring or as its slightly ridiculous simulacrum.125 
There seems to be something about masculinity within the professional 
culture of our times that enables such an idiom, and enables the status 
required to deploy it. The language and the practice of governance are 
gendered in ways which no doubt exceed the awareness of the current author. 
Switching attention from an individual level to a collective level and back 
again, a kind of deconstructive style of thinking, may have the effect of 
shaking the gendered discourse into visibility. This is needed no less at global 
levels than at local or regional levels. And, like deconstruction, that kind of 
shaking never stays done.  
                                                 
123 Ward, ibid 107. 
124 This attitude, or a literary appropriation of it, seems to be what Walter Benjamin was 
referring to when he commented that ‘[i]t is from the soggy ground of such experiences that 
Kafka’s female characters arise. They are swamp creatures…’: Walter Benjamin, One-Way 
Street and Other Writings (Penguin, 2009) 216. Kafka has other uses for gendered expression, 
equally enigmatic if less bizarre: ‘In the village on Castle Hill they have an expression that 
sheds some light here. “There’s a saying here, perhaps you know it: ‘Official decisions have 
the shyness of young girls’”, quoted in Ward, ibid 197. 
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